# Carlo Alberto Medal Lecture: Global Capital Allocation Project

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### Global Capital Allocation

The basic question of how capital is allocated globally

Who gets it? Who provides it? Which risks are shared? Which new risks are created?

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- Benefits:
  - Transfer capital from savers to productive users
  - Share risks, diversify
  - Equilibrate exchange rates, safe interest rates, cost of capital
- Problems:
  - Capital flights, crises, and endogenous amplification of risks
  - Unequal access to capital: global capital markets not a level playing field
  - System can be gamed: multinationals and tax havens

## Global Capital Allocation Project

- ▶ Last 15 years dominated by severe crises and policy interventions in capital markets
- ▶ Realization that "who owns which assets" is an important macro question
- ► GCAP is a research effort to shed light on how capital moves around the world and design better policies to improve outcomes

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- ► GCAP is a research effort to shed light on how capital moves around the world and design better policies to improve outcomes
- Today we'll focus on:
  - ► The importance of currency in shaping capital allocations
  - ► The role of international currencies
  - Tax havens and offshore financial centers

#### THE GLOBAL CAPITAL ALLOCATION PROJECT

#### OUR AIM IS TO SHED LIGHT ON HOW CAPITAL MOVES AROUND THE WORLD TO IMPROVE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICY



#### UPDATES







#### IN THE NEWS





NBER Digest: "Tax Haven Financing Skews Cross-Border Investment Statistics"

# A Group Effort




# Basic Stylized Facts: Home Country and Currency Bias

- ► Home bias: investors overweight domestic securities
- Use micro-data to dig deeper
  - Establish importance of currency in shaping global portfolios
  - "Home currency bias"


# Morningstar Holding Data

- ➤ \$37 trillion (in 2017) of worldwide mutual fund and ETF positions from Morningstar
- Position-level: unique CUSIP
- ► We focus on 10 developed markets
- ▶ Long time series: USA since 1995, RoW since 2003
- ▶ We harmonize the data and merge it with security and firm information


## Share of Investment in Country i's Corporate Debt in i's Currency, 2017



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# Identifying the Importance of Currency: Micro Data

▶ Run security-level regressions to study how investors in different countries buy the debt of the *same* firm in *different* currencies:

$$s_{j,p,c} = \alpha_j + \delta_{j,p} + \beta_j \mathbf{1}_{\{\text{Currency}_c = LC_j\}} + Controls + \epsilon_{j,p,c}$$

- $ightharpoonup s_{j,p,c}$  is share of security c issued by firm p that is held by country j
- ► Home currency dummy:  $\mathbf{1}_{\{\mathsf{Currency}_c = \mathsf{LC}_j\}}$
- $ightharpoonup \delta_{j,p}$  is a firm (ultimate parent) fixed effect
- Controls included for maturity and coupon

# Within-Firm Variation, All Issuers

$$s_{j,p,c} = \alpha_j + \delta_{j,p} + \beta_j \mathbf{1}_{\{Currency_c = LC_j\}} + Controls + \epsilon_{j,p,c}$$

j	CAN	EMU	GBR	USA	
Currency	0.899***	0.559***	0.446***	0.626***	
Currency	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.022)	(0.013)	
Obs.	36,229	36,229	36,229	36,229	
# of Firms	7,802	7,802	7,802	7,802	
$R^2$	0.958	0.848	0.800	0.892	
Firm FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	

Estimates for year 2017, weighted least squares, SE clustered at firm level

# Home-Country Bias and Home-Currency Bias?

- ▶ Similar regression framework, but now consider three specifications:
  - 1. Home country dummy:  $\mathbf{1}_{\{Country_o=j\}}$
  - 2. Home currency dummy:  $\mathbf{1}_{\{Currency_c = LC_i\}}$
  - 3. Home country and home currency dummies

$$s_{i_p,j,p,c} = \alpha_j + \frac{\phi_j}{1_{\{\text{Country}_p = j\}}} + \beta_j \mathbf{1}_{\{\text{Currency}_c = LC_j\}} + Controls + \epsilon_{i_p,j,p,c}$$

▶ No firm fixed effects to allow for country variation

# Bond Home-Country Bias and Home-Currency Bias

 $s_{i_p,j,p,c} = \alpha_j + \frac{\phi_j}{1_{\{Country_p = j\}}} + Controls + \epsilon_{i_p,j,p,c}$ 

	Only Country Indicators	
	$\phi$	$R^2$
CAN	0.492	0.403
CHE	0.371	0.240
EMU	0.419	0.270
EIVIU	0.419	0.270
GBR	0.221	0.135
SWE	0.545	0.522
USA	0.482	0.400

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	Only Country		Only C	Only Currency	
	Indicators		Indicators		
	$\phi$	$R^2$	β	$R^2$	
CAN	0.492	0.403	0.941	0.919	
CHE	0.371	0.240	0.825	0.884	
EMU	0.419	0.270	0.682	0.692	
CDD	0.001	0.105	0.551	0.650	
GBR	0.221	0.135	0.551	0.658	
SWE	0.545	0.522	0.810	0.920	
JVVL	0.545	0.522	0.010	0.920	
USA	0.482	0.400	0.677	0.777	

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
	Only Country		Only Currency		Country and Currency		
	Indicators		Indicators		Indicators		
	$\phi$	$R^2$	β	$R^2$	$\phi$	$\beta$	$R^2$
CAN	0.492	0.403	0.941	0.919	0.034	0.914	0.921
CHE	0.371	0.240	0.825	0.884	0.067	0.791	0.890
EMU	0.419	0.270	0.682	0.692	0.085	0.636	0.700
GBR	0.221	0.135	0.551	0.658	0.031	0.537	0.660
SWE	0.545	0.522	0.810	0.920	0.040	0.778	0.921
USA	0.482	0.400	0.677	0.777	0.089	0.620	0.785

# Currency Bias and Foreign Capital Allocation

- ▶ Investors buy bonds in their own currency or in USD
- ▶ How does this affect the allocation of capital to firms within and across countries?


# Foreigners Avoid Local Currency Issuers

#### Canada




# Foreigners Avoid LC Issuers Debt, Not Their Shares


Canada: Local Currency Issuers, Equity Securities



#### Local Currency Only Issuers



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


#### International Currencies

- ▶ International currency issuance affects capital allocation
- Novel benefits of issuing an international currency: akin to opening capital account for LC-only borrowers
- ► How has this status changed over time?

# Changes in International Use of Currency

### Corporate Bonds, Cross-Border Positions




# Many Open Questions


- ▶ What frictions prevent some firms from borrowing in foreign currency?
- What determines investor currency preferences?
- What are the real effects of changes in international currency use?
- ▶ What are the benefits and risks of dollar hegemony?


The Importance of Tax Havens and Offshore Centers














# How Big A Deal is This?

- ➤ Tax Haven's (TH's) account for > 10% of all cross-border portfolio positions. 15% of US foreign portfolio holdings are in Cayman Islands!
- $\blacktriangleright$  TH issuances account for  $\approx 10\%$  of all corporate financing, and nearly 50% of all cross-border issuances
- ► For some emerging markets, *nearly all* of corporate sector's bond financing from developed markets flows through THs
- ► Rapid growth since at least 2005

## Residency-based vs. Nationality-based Statistics

- What is meant by Residency and Nationality?
- ► Cases where Residency = Nationality:
  - Non-US governments issue USD bonds in New York (Brazil)
- ► Cases where Nationality  $\stackrel{?}{\succ}$  Residency :
  - ► Issue through foreign operating subsidiary (Toyota Motors NA)
- ► Cases where Nationality > Residency :
  - ► Issue in THs through foreign shell-company (Petrobras)
  - ► Tax inversions to THs (Medtronic)

## Aggregate Each Security to Ultimate Parent Company

▶ Use info from CGS, Morningstar, Factset, Dealogic, SDC, Capital IQ, and Orbis to map 27m securities from issuer (Residency) to ultimate parent (Nationality).

Issuer	Residency	Parent	Nationality	Value (\$B)
A. Corporate bonds				
Petrobras Intl. Finance Co.	CYM	Petroleo Brasileiro SA	BRA	12.8
Gaz Capital SA	LUX	Gazprom PJSC	RUS	29.7
B. Equities				
Alibaba Group Holding Ltd.	CYM	Alibaba Group Holding Ltd.	CHN	441.6
Medtronic Plc	IRL	Medtronic Plc	USA	85.7

### Restating Official Statistics with Reallocation Matrices

- ▶ Merge mapping with Morningstar data on mutual fund and ETF + US Insurance companies + Norwegian SWF positions
- ► Key assumption: Within each year, asset class, and bilateral country pair, fund holdings are representative of the universe of portfolio investment
  - Verify assumption with US insurance and Norwegian SWF

What share of investments in each country on residency basis go to others when on a nationality basis? (rows sum to 100%):

**Share Reallocated To:** 

Destination	BRA	CHN	CYM	GBR	LUX	USA	RoW
BRA	100.0						
CHN		99.2		8.0			
CYM	20.1	33.0	1.4	3.5		13.3	28.7
GBR	0.2			86.5		4.0	9.3
LUX	4.7	0.1		1.5	4.4	44.8	44.5
USA	0.3	0.1		1.3		92.3	6.0

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### Restating TIC for the US: Corporate Bonds

		Tax Have	Tax Haven Only		onality
Destination	TIC	Position	Δ	Position	Δ
Brazil	8	50	42	68	59
Bermuda	30	0	-30	0	-30
Cayman Islands	80	1	-79	1	-79
China	3	47	44	55	52
Hong Kong	8	7	-1	9	0
India	6	6	1	21	15
Ireland	63	24	-39	40	-23
Luxembourg	72	3	-69	3	-69
Russia	0	12	12	12	12


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
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### Developed Market Investment in BRICS Bonds




## The Ins and Outs of Capital Allocation: Eurozone Bond Investments




# Restating TIC for the US: Equity

		Tax Have	n Only	Full Natio	nality
Destination	TIC	Position	Δ	Position	Δ
Brazil	119	120	1	107	-13
Bermuda	195	1	-194	1	-194
Cayman Islands	547	0	-547	0	-547
China	<b>154</b>	695	541	695	541
Hong Kong	147	134	-13	134	-12
India	179	181	2	173	-6
Ireland	385	71	-315	71	-314
Luxembourg	33	4	-29	4	-29
Russia	55	62	7	61	7


## Developed Market Investment in Chinese Equity




#### The Rise of China in Tax Havens



### Standard vs. VIE Structure



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
# Implications for China's Net Foreign Assets (NFA)

▶ Net Foreign Asset Position (*NFA*) captures net claims on RoW:

$$NFA = A - L$$
  
 $\Delta NFA = CA + Valuation Changes$ 


- ▶ VIE structure causes understatement of *L* 
  - Missing valuation changes

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
#### Does VIE Structure Result in Mismeasurement of NFA?

▶ Unclear exactly how positions associated with VIEs are booked. But they do not appear linked to listed company market values.




## Might the VIEs Be in Other Liabilities Categories?

► Focusing on surge in value of VIEs from 2016:Q4 to 2018:Q1:




### Might the VIEs Be in Other Liabilities Categories?

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## NFA Mismeasurement is Large




### Much More in Paper and Online


- ► Alternate reallocation methodologies (e.g. sales)
- ▶ Full reallocation and issuance matrices by country, year, asset class
- Disaggregated bilateral investment data (currency, industry, by asset class)
- Results based on global issuance distribution matrix for many more countries

#### Sales-Based Reallocation


- ▶ Assign firms to *multiple* countries according to geographic distribution of sales
- China exposure becomes even larger than under nationality




### The Rise of China in the US External Portfolio



### The Rise of China in the US External Portfolio



### The Rise of China in the US External Portfolio



#### Conclusion

- ► Novel view of Global Capital Allocations
- Methodology:
  - ▶ Pierce veil of THs and restate bilateral investments
- Takeaways:
  - Importance of currency
  - Large and growing dollar role
  - ▶ DM exposure to large EMs much bigger than in official data
  - ▶ Drives huge NFA mismeasurement in China (elsewhere?)
- ► Follow Global Capital Allocation Project, download estimates and codes: www.globalcapitalallocation.com

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